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Abstract
By supplementing income explicitly through payments or implicitly through taxes
collected, income-based taxes and transfers make disposable income less variable.
Because disposable income determines consumption, policies that smooth disposable
income also create welfare improving consumption insurance. With data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics we find that annual consumption variation is reduced by
almost 20 percent due to explicit and implicit income smoothing. Consumption insurance
is as important economically as private health or automobile insurance. Although taxes
have become an increasingly important source of consumption insurance, the 2001
income-tax reform legislation should have little effect on implicit consumption insurance.
Key Words: consumption, implicit insurance, income taxes, transfer payments, PSID

Introduction
Everyone agrees that social insurance is an important mechanism used to stabilize
income, and in turn consumption. In practice, the most important governmentally
provided income insurance may not be explicit social insurance programs but rather
income taxes. With income-based taxation when before-tax income falls the household’s
tax burden also falls so that after-tax spendable income drops by less than the drop in
pre-tax income. We examine both implicit and explicit income insurance and find that the
amount of implicit income insurance occurring through the structure of income taxes is
actually comparable to or of greater magnitude than the much-explored explicit social
insurance.
Income insurance is important because a central goal of economic policy is to
stabilize household consumption in the presence of adverse economic events. When there
is an economy-wide income shock, such as a recession, the Federal Reserve or Congress
implement counter-cyclical monetary or fiscal policy to support the employment and
incomes of households generally. When an income shock is idiosyncratic to the
household, perhaps due to poor health of a primary earner, a change in family structure,
or a job loss caused by an industry or occupation shakeout, relevant public policy is the
system of explicit and implicit income insurance programs. The most well known
examples of explicit income insurance are Social Security (OASI), Unemployment
Insurance (UI), Medicare, Workers’ Compensation Insurance (WC), and means-tested
transfers such as the Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Economically more subtle

is the income insurance embedded in the federal and state income tax system, including
the payroll tax (FICA) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The main focus of our
research is to assess empirically the relative contributions of explicit versus implicit
income insurance in reducing consumption volatility in the United States.
It is instructive to establish some basic relative magnitudes of explicit and implicit
insurance. Table 1 presents expenditures on social insurance programs, means-tested
transfer payments, and income-based taxes and tax credits for 1979, 1989, and 1999.
Social security and Medicare smooth consumption during retirement, and UI, DI, and
WC buffer income and consumption during the working life. Overall real expenditures on
social insurance almost doubled in the last 20 years due largely to notable growth in
social security and disability insurance coupled with huge increases in Medicare
expenditures. Adding to enhanced income and consumption stabilization since 1979 are
real outlays on means-tested transfers, which increased nearly 140 percent. Transfer
payment increases in the United States are from expansions in Medicaid, SSI, and
housing assistance programs.1 Although social insurance as a fraction of real GDP
remained roughly constant over time, means-tested transfers as a fraction of real GDP
increased by 30 percent.
Real growth in individual income tax collections during 1979–1999 is similar to
the real growth in social insurance and the share of real GDP paid as individual income
taxes also remained relatively constant. Because of the relative growth in the payroll and
state income taxes and a six-fold increase in the EITC, which reduced tax collections, the
share of federal income tax receipts in total tax collections has fallen since 1979. State
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and local income-based taxation has become relatively more important as implicit income
insurance.
Table 2 highlights some of the economically significant changes to tax parameters
in the federal income tax code, the payroll tax, and the EITC. The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) broadened the tax
base and reduced the number of federal income tax brackets from 16 to four. The
marginal tax rate on the highest income earners dropped from 70 percent in 1979 to 28
percent in 1989 and then rose to 39.6 percent following the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993. Although the tax reforms of the 1980s removed several
million households from the federal tax rolls, substantial expansions in the payroll tax
base caused a shift in tax burdens from income to payroll. The fraction of families with
relatively higher payroll tax burdens increased from 44 percent in 1979 to nearly 67
percent in 1999 (Mitrusi and Poterba, 2000). Through creating higher phase-in (subsidy)
rates, higher income cutoffs, and differential benefits based on the household’s number of
qualifying children the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 increased
EITC generosity. A major part of the secular change in source of household tax liability
in the United States is the expansion in the EITC during the 1990s.2
Access to the explicit insurance described in Table 1 is restricted based on age,
health status, income status, asset status, or industry (whether employment is covered by
UI). Because access to the federal and state income tax code is automatic it might be the
case that income-based taxation is a readier channel of income insurance and subsequent
consumption stability for many households. The implicit insurance that income taxes
provide is perhaps enhanced further by the substantial changes in the tax code over the
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past two decades. In particular, Kniesner and Ziliak (forthcoming) show that a married
couple with median income who suffer a 30 percent income loss experience just over a
20 percent consumption drop during the late 1980s but only a 14 percent consumption
drop during the late 1990s. The reason for the increased implicit insurance recently can
be seen in Table 2, where we see that the median family not only faces a higher payroll
tax rate in the late 1990s but also faces a relatively steep phase-out rate of 21 percent in
the EITC.
We use data on U.S. households from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) for 1980–1991 to examine the impact of explicit and implicit insurance on
income and consumption volatility. Based on the work of Kniesner and Ziliak
(Forthcoming) we specify a model where consumption volatility depends on estimated
consumption function parameters, income variances, and covariances among gross
income, transfer income, and tax payments. Our project first examines the connection
between income and consumption volatility across families generally. We then consider
low versus moderate versus high average income families to identify the part of the longterm income distribution most affected by explicit versus implicit insurance. We find that
explicit insurance reduces overall average consumption volatility by 8.5 percent while
income taxes reduce consumption volatility by an additional 10 percent. Implicit
consumption insurance increases as one moves up the income distribution, and it
increased across the board by the early 1990s compared to the early 1980s. Tax reforms
enacted in 2001 should do little to change consumption insurance. We calculate that the
consumption insurance present in the U.S. system of taxes and transfers is as
economically important as automobile insurance or private health insurance.

4

Disposable Income Insurance and Consumption Volatility
The workhorse of the recent empirical consumption insurance literature is the
Euler equation for the relationship among changes in per person consumption (c/n),
disposable income (yd), and aggregate resources as metered by total consumption (C),
∆ ln(cth / nth ) = α∆ ln(Ct ) + β∆ ln( ydth ) + ∆ε th ,

(1)

where h indexes households.3 Government policy stabilizes disposable income and
consumption through two avenues because disposable income is ydth = yth (1 + gth − τ th ) ,
where gth = Gth / yth is the average transfer rate and τ th = Tt h / yth is the average tax rate.
Because disposable income depends on gross income ( y th ) and the average tax and
transfer rates, which also depend on gross income, the effect of changes in gross income
on disposable income and consumption is dampened by coincident changes in the
average and marginal tax rates and the transfer rate. Not always fully appreciated is that
even a flat-rate income tax stabilizes consumption.
To obtain some additional intuition consider the case of α = 0 = ∆ε th , which nets
out any effects of group insurance and random shocks or measurement errors.4 In the
simple case of no extra-family income effects the variance of consumption growth is
Var (∆ ln(cth / nth )) = β 2Var (∆ ln ydth ).

(2)

Given an estimate of β, equation (2) fleshes out how the income tax and transfer systems
reduce the variability of consumption changes once we substitute for the connection
between the variation in disposable income and policy.
Taking the natural log of disposable income and differencing transforms (2) into
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Var (∆ ln(cth / nth )) = β 2Var (∆ ln yth + ∆ ln(1 + g th − τ th )) .

(3)

Because the log of 1 plus and minus two small numbers is approximately the difference
in the two small numbers we can rewrite the variance decomposition in (3) as
Var (∆ ln(cth / nth )) ≈ β 2Var (∆ ln yth + ∆gth − ∆τ th ) .

(4)

The complete expression for the variance of consumption growth in light of the
components of disposable income and their variances and covariances is then
Var (∆ ln(cth / nth )) ≈

β 2{Var (∆ ln yth ) + Var (∆g th ) + Var (∆τ th ) +

(5)

2Cov(∆ ln y , ∆g ) − 2Cov(∆ ln y , ∆τ ) − 2Cov(∆g , ∆τ )}.
h
t

h
t

h
t

h
t

h
t

h
t

To implement the decomposition in (5) we use estimates of β̂ from Kniesner and
Ziliak (Forthcoming) along with the squared residuals from Mincer (1974)-type equations
for gross income, average transfer rates, and average tax rates as estimates of
Var (∆ ln yth ) , Var ( ∆g th ) , and Var ( ∆τ th ) .5 For example, the dependent variable in the first

Mincer-type regression equation is the proportionate change in gross income from year to
year and the independent variables are a quadratic in age, family size, self-employment,
union membership, state unemployment rate, and year dummies. A fixed effect sweeps
out all time-invariant regressors, such as race and education. The dependent variables in
the two other Mincer-type equations are the annual changes in the average tax rate and
the annual changes in the average transfer rate. Our measures of uncertainty are then
computed as follows. We save the N(T−1) × 1 vectors of residuals from the three Mincer
equations, square the residuals, and then calculate the average squared residual for each
year, which tracks income, tax-rate, and transfer-rate uncertainty over time.6
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We construct the needed covariances directly using per-period residuals from the
three regressions for changes in gross income and the tax and transfer rates just
described.

The

Cov(∆ ln yth , ∆τ th ) =

covariance
1
H

H

å ∆ ln y
h =1

h
t

of

income

and

the

tax

rate

is

× ∆τ th − ∆ ln yt × ∆τ t , for example. We identify the

importance of implicit versus explicit programmatic insurance of consumption by
examining the decomposition in (5) with and without taxes or transfers.

Data
Our data are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the interview
years of 1980–1991, which is when the PSID has its most accurate household tax
information. The primary attraction of the PSID for our research is its detailed
information on household income and composition and the length and timing of the
panel, which encompasses several reforms concerning the taxes and transfers that provide
income and consumption insurance in the United States. Although the PSID contains
information for years before 1980 and after 1991, our sample begins in 1980 because it is
when the PSID started including its most accurate, computer-generated, income tax data,
and our sample ends in 1991 because it is when the PSID stopped collecting tax
information.
Because we have no reason to suspect a connection between consumption
expenditure dynamics and participation in the PSID our data are an unbalanced panel
where we treat missing person years as statistically ignorable (exogenous). Persons
included in our sample are household heads that (1) are at least 25 years old in 1980 and
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less than 65 years old in 1991, (2) finished with school by 1980, (3) were not
permanently disabled or institutionalized, and (4) did not change marital status during the
sample period.7 To downplay the influence of outliers we omit person years with over a
300 percent increase in disposable income or more than a 75 percent decrease in income
from the previous year. As a final data cleaning procedure we only consider a person year
with disposable income of at least $1,000.8 The selection criteria we use create a sample
of 12,341 person years for 1,298 households.
The focal variables in the variance decomposition model in equation (5) are gross
income, average tax rates, and average transfer rates. Gross income is labor earnings plus
income from rent, interest, and dividends. Transfers include social insurance (Social
Security, SSI, AFDC, food stamps, and veteran’s benefits) as well as private transfers
(child support, alimony, and gifts from relatives). Because the main sources of transfers
are income conditioned, transfer payments are one of two main components of insurance
supporting disposable income and in turn consumption. The other component of
consumption insurance, income taxation, needs some discussion about its calculation and
accuracy.
Until 1992 the PSID used the household’s exemptions, based on reported
information on dependents, and the PSID used deductions, based on the larger of the
standard deduction and typical itemized deductions for the family of interest, to calculate
the households’ federal taxes and tax rates. The panel also contains an estimate of the
family’s potential Earned Income Tax Credit, which we incorporate. Finally, we also
include FICA taxes and the relevant state income tax payments, which for tractability we
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take as a proportional tax on income with the tax rate determined by the average income
tax rate in the state (State Government Tax Collections, 1980–1992 Tax Years).

Results
We present our empirical results in two stages. First we examine the relative
importance of unexpected changes in disposable income variability across households
and over time. Across households we study the uncertainty component of incomes by
permanent income groupings and note how income uncertainty is affected by taxes versus
transfers across income groups. Over time we study how the various tax reforms have
affected the amount of income uncertainty by smoothing disposable income. The second
step of our empirical research is to use equation (5) to connect the degree of income
variability to consumption variability, which is a negative component of household
economic well being. As we saw in the last section, if consumption is simply proportional
to disposable income then consumption variability is just a fractional multiple of
disposable income variability. The situation is more complex if the effect of disposable
income on consumption varies over time or across income groups, which we also
consider.
Estimated Income Uncertainty

To maximize understanding and the robustness of our inferences we examine
income in a sequence: (1) labor and capital incomes, (2) labor and capital incomes plus
transfers, (3) labor and capital incomes less taxes, and (4) labor and capital incomes plus
transfers less taxes. The calculations in (2) and (3) inform us about the relative reduction
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in income volatility due to taxes alone and transfers alone, while the calculation in (4)
also incorporates a covariance between taxes and transfers. Recall that transfers include
social insurance as well as private transfers, while taxes include federal income taxes,
FICA, average state income taxes, and Earned Income Tax Credits received. Netting out
predictable changes in components of disposable income is the next step in examining
how income uncertainty varies across households inclusive of taxes and transfers.
Based on equation (5), the top line in Figure 1 plots the annual average squared
residual measure of income uncertainty in the absence of taxes and transfers. The line
connecting the points denoted by ◊’s shows the reduction in income variability when
taxes are netted out, the line connecting the points denoted by ∆’s adds in transfer
payments to gross income, and the bottom line shows the full reduction in variability due
to transfers and taxes. Figure 1 shows that overall taxes and transfers reduce disposable
income variability by roughly the same amounts (about 14 percent each).9 Also apparent
is that the policy changes of the 1980s led to a greater income variability over households
in the United States that seems to be reversing in the 1990s.
Figures 2–4 are similar to Figure 1 but with the extra feature that the data are
organized by the household’s location in the distribution of permanent income. To
elaborate, we first compute the 12-year average income for each household, call that
permanent income, order permanent incomes, and find median permanent income. We
label as low income the households with permanent incomes less than 50 percent of the
median, label as moderate income the households whose permanent incomes range 50–
150 percent of the median, and label as high income those households with permanent
incomes greater than 150 percent of the median.
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Low and high permanent income families have patterns distinct from the average
family and distinct from each other. For low-income households the temporal pattern is
similar to the overall picture, but transfers are a more important disposable income
stabilizer than taxes. The situation is distinctly different for high-income families, who
get virtually no transfer payments so that their disposable incomes are stabilized mainly
by income-based taxes. Tax rate reductions after TRA86 sharply increased the disposable
income uncertainty for the highest income households, which has not totally reversed
during the 1990s as it has for lower income groups.
Estimated Consumption Volatility

To operationalize the consumption variance decomposition summarized in (5) we
again net out predictable components of the data series by using the person-year squared
residuals from fixed-effect income growth regressions and parallel regressions for the
annual change in the average transfer rate and the annual change in the average tax rate.
The error variances and covariance are the components of (5) that track the relative
contributions to the household’s consumption variability and subsequent welfare loss. For
our calculations across all families we use our preferred estimate of βˆ = 0.78 from
Kniesner and Ziliak (Forthcoming).10 For calculations stratifying by the three permanent
income groups we use our estimates, βˆ1 = 0.81 , βˆ2 = 0.70 , and βˆ3 = 0.63 , which show

the effect of disposable income changes on consumption changes declining with
permanent income level.11
Table 3 summarizes the outcomes of interest. Again we highlight the
contributions of policy by displaying the variability of consumption first in the absence of
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policy then in the presence of transfers separately, taxes separately, and taxes and
transfers jointly as income components. Across all families in our data, adding transfers
reduces consumption volatility by about 8.5 percent on average (4.481/4.895 ≅ 0.915).
Netting out taxes reduces consumption fluctuations an additional 10 percent
(4.018/4.895). Across all families the tax code provides more consumption insurance,
10.5 percent, than social insurance and public and private transfers. For low-income
families, transfers stabilize consumption by about 10 percent, and taxes combined with
transfers stabilize consumption by 18 percent. For moderate-income families, transfers
stabilize consumption by about 10 percent and taxes plus transfers stabilize consumption
by 21 percent. For the highest income families, transfers stabilize consumption by only
about two percent, but taxes alone reduce consumption volatility by 10 percent. Table 3
emphasizes how across income substrata taxes are a more important stabilizer of
consumption than transfers with the largest consumption stabilizing impact of taxes
coming at the highest levels of permanent income.
Figures 5–8 illustrate the year-to-year patterns that underlie the overall averages
in Table 3. Most evident is how taxes and transfers mitigate the aggregate level of
consumption variability (Figure 5) with the importance of taxes and transfers equally split
during the early 1980s except for the high-income families (Figures 6–8). More recently,
taxes have gained in importance across the board as a source of income and consumption
stabilization. Particularly striking in Figures 5–8 is how consumption insurance has
evolved during 1981–1991 for low and moderate-income families. In the early 1980s low
and moderate income families received a relatively large proportion of their consumption
stabilization from transfer payments. After TRA86 the tide turned away from transfers
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and toward taxes as automatic stabilizers. The change in focus of U.S. policies
concerning income support and redistribution continues in the middle 1990s with the
coupling of welfare reform with EITC expansions. As the result of policy since the early
1980s, comparatively little consumption smoothing now emanates from transfer
payments compared to the income tax code. Interestingly, when there is decreasing
absolute risk aversion in permanent income, as in our case here, then insurance is an
inferior good (Mossin (1968), Arrow (1971, Chapter 3)). Unlike the typical case where
efficiency and equity considerations are offsetting the reductions in income insurance
with permanent income level we identify are not only equitable but are also economically
efficient.
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001

Recently, Congress passed and President Bush signed into law The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). Among other things, the
law lowers the rate in the highest federal income tax bracket and creates a new (10
percent) bracket for some persons formerly in the 15 percent federal income tax bracket.
By lowering the tax rates for the highest income families and the lowest income families
with taxes owed, EGTRRA reduces implicit insurance. An offsetting factor is that the
structure of tax rates becomes more progressive than before as the ratio of the highest to
the lowest positive tax rate is now greater (over 3:1 versus 2.5:1). An insurance neutral
aspect of the Act is that a large concentration of taxpayers (about 50 percent of returns)
remains in the 15 percent income tax bracket despite its narrowing. Because some
components of EGTRRA add to disposable income smoothing, some components reduce
disposable income smoothing, and other components leave the amount of smoothing
13

more or less unchanged we expect little effect on economic well being stemming from
changes in implicit insurance in the most recent round of tax reform.

Discussion
The welfare-enhancing effect of reduced consumption variability is an underappreciated dimension of income-based taxes. Annual consumption variation is reduced
by about 10 percent due to implicit income smoothing. In the United States taxes do as
much to stabilize income and consumption implicitly as do social insurance programs
explicitly. Over time the stabilizing effect of taxes has also been growing relative to the
stabilizing effect of transfers.
An instructive way to frame the importance of consumption insurance implicit in
the income tax code is to compare it to formal market purchased insurance. In Kniesner
and Ziliak (Forthcoming) we find that the current set of income-based taxes in the United
States enhances the typical household’s economic well being by an amount equivalent to
one to two percent more total consumption.12 Expressed in 2001 dollars the aggregate
welfare gain from income tax based implicit consumption insurance in the U.S. is in the
range $70–140 billion. Implicit consumption insurance is then of a magnitude roughly
similar to total private health insurance premiums collected, $155 billion, or total
automobile insurance premiums collected, $147 billion.13
A notable implication of the welfare enhancing reductions in consumption variability
from income-based taxation we find concerns the future of research into and practical
design of an economically optimal income tax. Up to now most of the optimal income tax
research has considered two dimensions of social welfare, the deadweight welfare loss
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because the income tax distorts labor supply (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999) and the welfare
gains because a nonlinear income tax produces greater equality of spendable income and
consumption (Auerbach and Hines 2001). Our results demonstrating the welfareenhancing importance of an income-based tax through its effects on consumption
dynamics imply that future optimal tax research need consider a third dimension, which
is how an optimal tax creates beneficial dampening of otherwise unintended fluctuations
in spendable income and consumption. The interesting complexity of three-dimensional
optimal tax research will be that although a flatter tax structure has welfare-increasing
effects because it reduces labor supply distortions, a flatter tax structure also has welfare
reducing effects because it may not only promote less equal after-tax incomes and
consumption levels but it also lowers implicit insurance of incomes and consumption.
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Endnotes

*

Esther Gray and Mindy Tanner cheerfully and skillfully helped with manuscript
preparation. Martha Bonney provided her usual expert referencing help.

1.

An extensive discussion of social insurance and means-tested transfer programs is
in Scholz and Levine (Forthcoming).

2.

Some useful empirical studies of recent income tax reforms are Auerbach (1996),
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Auerbach and Slemrod (1997), Burman, Gale,
and Weiner (1998), Engen and Gale (1996), Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder
(1994), and Pechman (1985).

3.

A short reading list is Cochran (1991), Gruber (1997), Ham and Jacobs (2000),
Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), Kniesner and Ziliak (Forthcoming), Mace
(1991), Morduch (1995), Nelson (1994), and Townsend (1994). Much of the
literature is concerned with testing for complete insurance, or whether βˆ = 0 .

4.

By setting α = 0 we simply adjust the scale of insurance but do not alter the
relative contributions of taxes and transfers across households or over time.

5.

In Kniesner and Ziliak (Forthcoming) we produce βˆ with a forward-filter
instrumental variables estimator applied to equation (1). Additional control
variables include the number of children, the age of the youngest child, as well as
the race, education, and five-year birth cohort of the household head.

6.

For additional discussion of measuring income volatility see Dynarski and Gruber
(1997) and Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).

7.

The marital status screen means that the persons in our data keep the same tax
table, which simplifies understanding how tax reforms that interact with incomesplitting provisions affect insurance implicit in income taxes.

8.

There are a small number of person-years with average tax rates or average
transfer rates that exceed 100 percent. Close examination of the observations with
extreme tax or transfer rates reveals that they are outliers, which we remove from
our calculations.

9.

Additional useful references on income and consumption stabilization in the
United States include Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Cohen and Follette (2000),
Gruber (1997, 2000), and Hamermesh (1982).
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10.

Estimated from models of total consumption, defined as disposable income less
saving.

11.

We do not reject the null hypothesis that βˆ is unchanging over time, however.

12.

The basis of comparison is a lump-sum tax that collects the same revenue but
provides no implicit income and consumption insurance.

13.

Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000, pp. 530-531 expressed in 2001
dollars using CPI.
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Table 1. Changes in Selected Sources of Income Insurance, 1979–1999
(billions of $1999)
1979

1989

1999

355.9
(6.9)

504.7
(7.3)

683.9
(7.4)

207.8
66.9
22.6
27.2
31.4

279.5
129.7
18.7
46.1
30.7

334.4
233.4
21.4
43.4
51.3

115.6
(2.3)

159.7
(2.3)

276.2
(3.0)

Medicaid
Supplement Security
AFDC/TANF
Food Stamps
Housing Assistance

49.9
16.2
24.7
14.9
9.9

82.3
19.8
23.2
15.7
18.7

189.5
29.8
13.5
15.8
27.6

Individual Income Taxes
(Percent of Real GDP)

893.3
(17.4)

1201.3
(17.4)

1663.6
(17.9)

Social Insurance
(Percent of Real GDP)
OASI
Medicare
Unemployment Insurance
Workers Compensationa
Disability Insurance
Means-Tested Transfers
(Percent of Real GDP)

879.6
599.2
499.5
Federal
172.4
119.2
75.2
State
611.6
483.1
318.6
Payroll (FICA)
31.9
8.9
4.7
Earned Income Tax Credit
Notes: Data on social insurance, means-tested transfers, and the EITC are from Scholz and Levine
(Forthcoming). Data on federal income taxes, payroll taxes, and real GDP are from the 2001 Economic
Report of the President. Data on state income taxes are from the Department of Commerce’s State
Government Tax Collections in 1979, 1989, and 1999.
a
Due to missing data, the 1980 value appears for 1979; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1998, p.
377.
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Table 2. Changes in Selected Federal Tax Parameters, 1979–1999a

1979
MTR
(percents)
0
14
16
18
21
24
28
32
37
43
49
54
59
64
68
70

6.13

Range
($1,000)
0–3.4
3.4–5.5
5.5–7.6
7.6–11.9
11.9–16.0
16.0–20.2
20.2–24.6
24.6–29.9
29.9–35.2
35.2–45.8
45.8–60.0
60.0–85.6
85.6–109.4
109.4–162.4
162.4–215.4
215.4+

0–22.9

1979
(range in $1,000)
Phase-In
Rate
Phase-Out Rate
10.0
12.5
(0–5.0)
(6.0–10.0)

Income Taxb
1989
MTR
Range
(percents)
($1,000)
15
0–30.95
28
30.95–74.85
33
74.85–177.72
28
177.72+

7.51

Payroll Taxc
0–48.0

Earned Income Tax Creditd
1989
(range in $1,000)
Phase-In Rate
14.0
(0–6.5)

Phase-Out Rate
10.0
(10.24–19.34)

1999
MTR
(percents)
15
28
31
36
39.6

6.20
1.45

Range
($1,000)
0–43.05
43.05–104.05
104.05–158.55
158.55–283.15
283.15+

0–72.6
0–

1999
(range in $1,000)
Phase-Out
Rate
Phase-In Rate
7.65
7.65
(5.67–10.2)
(0–4.53)
34.0
(0–6.8)

15.98
(12.46–26.93)

40.0
21.06
(0–9.54)
(12.46–30.58)
a
Data on the federal income tax and payroll tax parameters are from the Commerce Clearing House U.S.
Master Tax Guide for 1980 and 1990, and from the 1999 Forms and Publications link on the IRS WebPages
<http://www.irs.gov/forms_pubs/formpub99.html>. Data on the EITC parameters are from Ventry (2000).
b
Federal income tax rates and ranges are for a married couple filing jointly. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
altered the definition of taxable income to eliminate the so-called zero bracket amount.
c
Beginning in 1991 separate bases applied to the retirement and health-insurance portions of the payroll tax.
The tax base is labor market earnings.
d
Beginning in 1991, separate EITC parameters applied to families with one qualifying child versus more
than one qualifying child. Beginning in 1994 the EITC extends to families with no dependents. The tax base
is labor market earnings.
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Table 3. Consumption Volatility, Transfers, and Taxes 1981–1991a

Means

Standard
Deviations

Total Sample
Gross labor and capital income
Plus transfers
Less taxes
Plus transfers less taxes

4.895
4.481
4.378
4.018

0.268
0.260
0.253
0.275

Low Income Sub-sample
Gross labor and capital income
Plus transfers
Less taxes
Plus transfers less taxes

8.375
7.520
7.568
6.857

0.916
0.908
0.812
0.842

Moderate Income Sub-sample
Gross labor and capital income
Plus transfers
Less taxes
Plus transfers less taxes

3.199
2.875
2.823
2.534

0.223
0.218
0.195
0.215

High Income Sub-sample
Gross labor and capital income
2.591
0.352
Plus transfers
2.539
0.329
Less taxes
2.332
0.341
Plus transfers less taxes
2.282
0.311
a
The low-income households have 12-year average incomes below one-half the
median income; moderate-income households have average incomes between onehalf and one and one-half the median income; high-income households have
average incomes above one and one-half the median income.
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Plus Transfers Less Taxes
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Figure 1: Income Uncertainty for all Families 1981-1991
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(Log Points*100)
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Figure 2: Income Uncertainty for Low-Income Families
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Figure 3: Income Uncertainty for Moderate-Income Families
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Figure 4: Income Uncertainty for High-Income Families
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Figure 5: Consumption Volatility for all Families 1981-1991
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Figure 6: Consumption Volatility for Low-Income Families
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Figure 7: Consumption Volatility for Moderate-Income Families
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Figure 8: Consumption Volatility for High-Income Families
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